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Promoting Human Rights through Philosophy with Children 
Abstract 
tŚŝůĞŵƵĐŚŚĂƐďĞĞŶǁƌŝƚƚĞŶĂďŽƵƚĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ůŝƚƚůĞĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽ
have been said about the place children have in the promotion of human rights.  This article 
considers the concept of child in conjunction with citizenship eĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚĂŬĞĨŽƌǁĂƌĚĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ
promotion of human rights.  It is proposed that one approach, where individuals explore views and 
come to this through reason, dialogue and community engagement, would be through Philosophy 
with Children (PwC).  PwC provides space for children to engage in the political, that they might 
explore questions relevant to their lives as beings in society.  Such activity would not only prepare 
children for the political world, since this sees the child as deficit, but would facilitate their 
engagement politically as children.  The article proposes that philosophically deliberative children 
are required in order to support any society interested in the promotion of human rights. 
Keywords 




dŚĞƌĞŝƐ ?ŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ŵƵĐŚůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚtheir human rights more broadly.  
Similarly, publications on human rights acknowledge children in society.  This literature advocates 
chŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚǀŽŝĐĞ ?ǁŚŝůĞĂůƐŽĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŚĂƚĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶĂƌĞƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĞĚĂŶĚ
provided for; they are seen to be important members of society.  However, there seems to be 
something of an omission when considering children, rights, and their participation.  Little, if 
anything, is said about their active participation in the promotion ŽĨĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?KŶĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞ
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where this is evident is in Benjamin Gregg ?ƐďŽŽŬThe Human Rights State (2016) where he 
progresses his earlier work on human rights as social construction (2012). The goal of this second 
work is to present an idealised metaphorical state that focuses on its members determining and 
ƵƉŚŽůĚŝŶŐŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐǁŝƚŚĂǀŝĞǁƚŽĂĚǀĂŶĐŝŶŐ ‘ĂĨƌĞĞĞŵďƌĂĐĞŽĨŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐŝŶƚŚĞ
corresƉŽŶĚŝŶŐŶĂƚŝŽŶƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?ĂŶĚ ?ƚŽĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐĂƐĂŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĨĞĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ
ƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? )ǁŝƚŚĂǀŝĞǁƚŽĞŵďĞĚĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĞŝŶƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐĂŶĚƐǇƐƚĞŵƐďǇ
which the nation state is run.  Gregg fails to afford children the opportunity of a place in the 
development of a state where human rights is a focus and this, then, fails to allow for the 
opportunity that children may well be in a strong position to promote human rights more generally.  
Certainly children are often seen as worthy of being rights holders, but their potential ability to 
promote rights goes unnoticed or, at best, is under-played.  At the same time, human rights 
education is relatively under-researched. However, with the United Nations World Programme on 
Human Rights Education and Training (United Nations, 2011; Struthers, 2015) currently in train, and 
the subsequent growth in awareness of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(UNCRC) since its publication 1989, this has become something of a focus in educational research.  In 
addition, the measures adopted by states ratifying the Convention, such as in the UK with the 
appointment of children and young people ?s commissioners, also indicate that this is being 
addressed to some extent. Lundy (2012) also recognises the hEZ ?Ɛ potential for encouraging 
changes in law and policy, though she identifies serious failings on the part of European states in 
meeting the rights of children within their boundaries. Despite some positive moves towards 
meeting the goals of the UNCRC, in considering how human rights might be advanced at the broader 
societal level rather than only within communities of children, children tend to be excluded from the 
discussions. It is this omission that the present article aims to address. 
The first section of the article considers the concept of child.  In doing so, some problems of 
ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ status are identified, most notably in the political domain.  This leads to a discussion on 
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children as citizens and then consideration of citizenship education in relation to ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ status. 
The notion of ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ deliberative participation is explored in the subsequent section turns. As 
individuals have to learn how to deliberate, the final section of the paper suggests that one 
approach that might support ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ political engagement and, therefore, address their lower 
status, is the practice of Philosophy with Children.  
 
2 The child 
Concepts of child and childhood are important in how we think about human rights and the part 
they play in our lives.  In fact, the concept of child is central to taking forward a rights agenda that is 
ŝŶĐůƵƐŝǀĞĂŶĚƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞ ?'ƌĞŐŐ ? ? ? ? ? )ĂƐŬƐ ? ‘,ŽǁŝƐchild best defined?  At what age does 
ĐŚŝůĚŚŽŽĚĞŶĚ ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ). This latter question betrays his notion of child and childhood. The very 
question of when childhood ends exposes a perspective that sees children as  ‘ďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐ ? ?dŽview 
the child as becoming suggests that the individual is not a full member of society (see, for example: 
Kennedy, 1992, 2003, 2006; Friquenon, 1997; Mayall, 2007; Qvortrup 2006, 2007; Cassidy, 2007, 
2012a; Cook, 2009).   
Stables (2008) helpfully provides three ways in which child is often defined.  The first, very simply, is 
the biological notion, which asserts that we are all children since we all have had parents.  The 
second definition is the age-determined view of child which suggests that one stops being a child at 
a particular point, such as at eighteen, as outlined in Article 1 of the UNCRC (1989).  This age-
determined view is one adopted in asking when childhood ends.  This view misses the inherent 
difficulties in making the distinction between child/adult according to age; for example, the age at 
which one might marry is not necessarily the age at which one may vote or that in Scotland, for 
instance, someone of sixteen can vote in local elections but those of the same age in the rest of the 
UK cannot.  While a definition determined by age appears at first glance to be an easy approach, it is 
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messy in law and practice.  The third manner in which Stables suggests child might be defined is 
through the Aristotelian notion of potential.  The child is seen here as unfinished, that she is aspiring 
towards some determined and desirable potential, and that potential is adult.  In the manner in 
which an acorn will always become an oak or a puppy will become a dog, so too, the child will 
become an adult.  In discussing the child as becoming, Kennedy (1992, 2006) also suggests that the 
child is seen as raw material, that the adult is always travelling with the child until the potential is 
reached, until adulthood is achieved.  The time when one is a child, childhood, is often seen as a 
time when the individual is being socialised, or trained, for what they will become and the role they 
will, as adults, play.  Shamgar-Handelman (1994) describes this as the period when an individual 
begins their training, when they are socialised into being the type of individual deemed as desirable 
for society, ŽƌĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ƉĞƌŝŽĚŽĨĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐ^ƚĂďůĞƐ ? ? ? ?  Ɖ ?4) would put it.  In 
seeing the child as becoming, agency is denied the child. 
James et al. (1998) are very clear in their assertion that children are social actors.  The notion of child 
as agent has grown as the UNCRC ŚĂƐďĞĞŶĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚŝŶŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? legislation.  This does not, though, 
ŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐƐƚĂƚƵƐŚĂƐďĞĐŽŵĞŵŽƌĞĞůĞǀĂƚĞĚ ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ, it has been argued that the view of 
child presented is one that allows adults to retain control of the social order (Kennedy, 2003; Cook, 
2009).  Cassidy (2012a ) ?ŝŶĐŽŵŵĞŶƚŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶŝŶůŝŐŚƚŽĨƚŚĞhE ?ƐƌĞƉŽƌƚĐĂƌĚƐŽŶ 
progressing the UNCRC in the UK, for example, makes clear that children are seen as other, that they 
are seen as lesser and that such a perspective denies children as social actors.  This articulates with 
ŽŽŬ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ ‘ŚŝůĚƌĞŶĐĂŶŶĞǀĞƌƐŝŵƉůǇ ƚĂŶĚĨŽr themselves as individuals in the 
ŚĞƌĞĂŶĚŶŽǁ ?ƚŚĞǇǁĞĂƌƵƉŽŶƚŚĞŝƌďŽĚŝĞƐĂŶĚĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĞŝƌƐŽĐŝĂůǁŽƌůĚƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ) and these 
social worlds are determined by adults.  Cassidy (2007) suggests that children are seen as adults 
minus certain desirable qualities such as being able to reason, to make moral decisions or to express 
considered views, while it might be more helpful to consider adults as children with such qualities or 
abilities. This, she would argue, allows children to be considered as persons. 
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Ultimately, the deficit notion of child raises questions around their participation in the world in 
which they live. Bacon and Frankel (2014) recognise children ?s lack of status, primarily due to the 
adult-centric view of children as passive individuals who are not able or competent to engage in the 
political world they inhabit. They propose that to make the shift towards children as agents a social 
partnership must be established where it is recognised by all that children have a place in society 
and that they play a part in determining and shaping the structures within that society. The extent to 
which children might participate is a challenging one as is clear from the problems in defining child 
by age. The notion that there remains an  ‘ĂŐĞ of ƌĞĂƐŽŶ ? that would allow access to participation is 
equally difficult.  It cannot simply be the case that those of five years-old have less of a say or input 
into what happens in their world than those of twelve or seventeen.  Certainly, one might assume 
that seventeen year-olds are more aware of the world around them, but we cannot take for granted 
that they will reason well about what they observe or that younger children do not. Reasoning well 
needs to be taught, as will be explored later in this article when discussing Philosophy with Children. 
Political participation rights are not removed from older individuals when they progress in their 
years, even if they display signs of diminished reasoning or poor memory.  In proposing a  ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ of 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? ? Wall (2012) identifies several countries in which children, across the age groups, are 
active in the decisions made in their communities.  He highlights, amongst other practices: New 
ĞĂůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ  ‘ŐĞŶĚĂ for ŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ? where it is expected that children are consulted on societal issues; 
South ĨƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ initiative to include children in public debates and some parliamentary hearings; the 
committees in the Israeli Knesset that include children as participants; the political consultation in 
Kazakstan with children between the ages of ten and fourteen; the Rajasthani ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ parliaments 
for six to fourteen year-olds to contribute to their communities; or the Brazilian children of Barra 
Mansa who have  ‘ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞ powers over issues concerning children and control parts of the city 
ďƵĚŐĞƚ ? (p.88).  
Child as political citizen has problems akin to child as becoming. The notion of citizenship is such that 
it relies on preparing the child for engagement in their future world as adults with full participation 
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rights. Osler and Starkey (2005) seem to recognise this when they assert that  ‘tŚĞŶ political 
theorists consider the process of ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? little thought is given to the interests and 
concerns of children ? (p.38).  Policy rhetoric and what happens in practice are often at variance; at 
the same time, children are said to be citizens now, not citizens in waiting, but in practice they are 
less than enfranchised.  This tension demands rethinking of the concept of child on the part of policy 
makers and when speaking of children and participation it is invariably linked to what happens in 
education.  Education for citizenship in schools tends to be the primary locus for children to learn 
about political participation. 
 
3 Children and citizenship 
The view of children as citizens now is not necessarily how some children see themselves.  In a study 
by Conrad, Cassidy and Mathis (2015) children were asked about the kind of society in which they 
would like to live.  Children in the study, from Switzerland and Scotland, failed to see themselves as 
social actors in the society they were describing.  In effect they colluded with the adult-determined 
worldview that decisions are made in a realm to which they do not belong.  This runs counter to 
ĂĐŽŶĂŶĚ&ƌĂŶŬĞů ?Ɛ(2014) suggestion that children are able to see the interdependence of all 
people, implying that children will see themselves as part of this interdependence.  That said, the 
children may see the interdependence but position themselves as passive in such a manner that it 
both structures and perpetuates the status quo. 
Citizenship is a political status in the sense that it is conferred  W or removed  W from an individual. In 
the context of rights when one is ascribed political rights such as citizenship it becomes problematic 
for children since they may be discriminated against on the grounds of their lack of political 
citizenship.  Asylum seeking children, for example, are entitled to protection and provision for their 
health and well-being under the likes of the UNCRC and the UDHR, yet they do not have certain 
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political rights (Kiwan, 2005). Arguably, children under these circumstances are doubly discriminated 
against by virtue of them seeking asylum and also in their being children, having decisions made for 
them with little power in the situation, even taking into account Article 12 from the UNCRC which 
clearly states that children are entitled to express their views in matters concerning them. While 
some children  W or even some adults  W might not fully grasp the politics that have made them flee 
their countries, all will understand and be able to express in some way their unhappiness, 
uncertainty or fear in relation to their plight. In making decisions about children, their views should 
be taken into account and they should be involved in the decision-making process; all to an eye with 
making them as safe as possible.  There is no suggestion that simply because an individual  W either 
adult or child  W expresses a view or desire that this is enacted.  Authentic participation demands 
engagement with different perspectives and that certain voices are not silenced.  Caution should be 
exerted to ensure that tokenistic consultation is avoided. 
What is problematic in considering children and citizenship in relation to the UNCRC is locating a 
matter that does not concern them. Biesta et al. (2009) would support this view since they note that 
 ‘ĂŶǇ aspect of their [children ?s] lives can be relevant for their growth as democratic citizens ? (p.10)  
because children, they say,  ‘ĂƌĞ part of the social fabric ? (p.20) to which we all belong. Of course, as 
proposed here, children are not actually able to participate in all aspects of society if they are also 
expected to undertake their schooling, though they share and inhabit many parts of the social world.  
Separating issues that belong to adults to the exclusion of children is impossible; children are 
affected by climate change, by living and working conditions, by the economy, by war, and so on. 
These are not the exclusive preserve of those over eighteen years of age or who pay taxes or who 
have reached a point when they are physically mature or any other constructed end point of 
childhood. While children cannot take up paid employment to effect decision-making in areas such 
as climate change or the economy or war, they should, at the very least, be involved in deliberation 
on these issues.  This deliberation should not be divorced entirely from the contexts in which adults 
engage.  The examples from Wall (2012) above would suggest that this is possible. 
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Writing in the 1950s Marshall (1950) explores the links between citizenship and social class. Bacon 
and Frankel (2014) urge that we look to Marshall ?s notion of citizenship when considering children 
and their place as social actors. They suggest that his work has informed much of the thinking 
around citizenship, where  ‘ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶship is a formal status which is administered through different 
social institutions ? (p.23).  Children, under Marshall ?s view, are in a state of becoming; they are 
citizens in waiting, with the aim of education being the formation of the adult (Bacon and Frankel, 
2014). Children, using this rationale, are akin to lumps of wax to be moulded for what society may 
demand of them in the future; they are not seen as beings in and of themselves since education 
systems are established to prepare children for what they will become  W adult. The reason, it seems, 
that we engage and educate children is not for them as they are now, but for the function they will 
ultimately perform in society. Considering children in such a manner fails to take account of their 
agency. Indeed, it marginalises and, therefore, excludes them from society and, if we follow Bacon 
and Frankel (2014), this runs the risk of encouraging children to perpetuate the structures that 
maintain this exclusion, as the study by Yyy et al. (2015) would suggest. In taking the human rights 
state forward, it is the education of the child citizen that needs to be addressed, as will be explored 
further below in relation to education for citizenship and the proposed inclusion of the current 
practice of Philosophy with Children. 
 
4 Citizenship education 
/ŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽŵĂŬĞƚŚĞĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐĂŐĞŶĐǇĂŶĚĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐŚŝƉƐƚĂƚƵƐ ?ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂů
systems and the associated pedagogical approaches employed in those systems must be reviewed 
(Santi and Di Masi, 2011).  In one way or another, curricula around the world involve some form of 
citizenship education.  It may be embedded within the curriculum generally such as in the Scottish 
Curriculum (Education Scotland, 2004) or the Dutch system where it is integrated across the 
curriculum (Veugelers, 2007).  For example, in Scotland the curriculum, Curriculum for Excellence 
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(Scottish Executive, 2004), is grounded in supporting children to become successful learners, 
confident individuals, effective contributors and responsible citizens.  Citizenship should be 
evidenced in all that teachers do within the curriculum; there are no discrete lessons on how to be a 
citizen (Biesta, 2008; Kisby, 2009; Cassidy, 2013; Cassidy & Christie, 2014).  Biesta (2008), however, 
suggests that this approach runs the risk of the political dimension of citizenship being overlooked in 
favour of the social dimension of citizenship, thereby omitting to teach children about the systems 
and their associated functions in a pluralist democracy.  For Veugelers (2007), though, while much 
focus is given to the globalised society, citizenship curricula are paradoxically more individualistic in 
ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?,ĞǁŽƵůĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝĞƐƚĂ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵƐŝƐ
important, but would hold that this goes beyond understanding the systems to engage with 
ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇĂƐĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂůƉĂƌƚŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐůŝĨĞ ? 
 
An alternative approach to citizenship education often takes the form of civics lessons where pupils 
learn about the systems and structures that govern their country; they are taught how decisions are 
made and how laws come into being.  Slovenia, for example, has a compulsory subject called Civic 
ĂŶĚWĂƚƌŝŽƚŝĐĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚŝĐƐǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉ ‘ƐƚƵĚĞŶƚƐ ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůŝƚĞƌĂĐǇ ?critical 
ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐĂŶĚǀĂůƵĞƐ ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞŝƌĂĐƚŝǀĞĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƐŽĐŝĂůůŝĨĞ ? ?ĂŶũĂĐ ?WƵƓŶŝŬ ?
 ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ) ?ĂŶũĂĐĂŶĚWƵƓŶŝŬ ? ? ? ? ? )ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĞŵĂŶŶĞƌŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶůĞĂƌŶĂďŽƵƚ
citizenship, and note that in the likes of Slovenia the emphasis is on belonging to the European 
Union community, a broader notion than individuals aligning themselves with a particular nation-
state.  In comparing the political socialisation of young people in formal education in twenty-seven 
countries by accessing the CIVED 99 datasets (http://www.iea.nl/cived.html), Wiseman et al. (2011) 
also note a shift in citizenship education that involves a move away from a national notion of civics 
to more global perspectives, though they identify perhaps less conformity in how nations approach 
civics or citizenship education than in pedagogies associated with the teaching and learning of 
mathematics and language.  UNESCO has a network of associated schools around the world, where 
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ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ ‘ĞŶŐĂŐĞĚŝŶĨŽƐƚĞƌŝŶŐĂŶĚĚĞůŝǀĞƌŝŶŐƋƵĂůŝƚǇĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƉƵƌƐƵŝƚŽĨƉĞĂĐĞ ?ůŝďĞƌƚǇ ?ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ
and human development in order to meet the pressing educational needs of children and young 
ƉĞŽƉůĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ? ?^ŚƵůƚǌ ?'ƵŝŵĂƌĂĞƐ-Iosif, 2012, p.243).  This, too, suggests a more 
global perspective in the approaches taken to citizenship education. 
While there is a clear notion of a global citizen, one where the wider community figures largely, 
there is a problem in determining what kind of citizen this will be.  Three kinds of citizens are 
proposed by Westheimer and Kahne (2004): the personally responsible citizen; the participatory 
citizen; and the justice-oriented citizen.  In exploring different citizenship curricula in the USA, they 
were able to determine the focus in different schools in terms of the kinds of citizenship they were 
trying to foster.  The personally responsible citizen is one where the individual behaves responsibly, 
they do things like obeying laws, paying taxes, recycling and volunteering.  The notion of 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŝƐƌĞƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚĂĐƌŽƐƐŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐŚŝƉĐƵƌƌŝĐƵůĂǁŝƚŚĂƐĞĞŵŝŶŐĞŵƉhasis on social 
order and obedience.  Participatory citizens also recognise the importance of community and tend to 
be more active in taking things forward through organising the likes of charity events or activities 
designed to improve the community by, for example, organising food drives or cleaning up the 
neighbourhood.  They will also know how governmental structures and agencies function.  The third 
category described is the justice-oriented citizen.  These citizens will similarly know how systems 
work but they will also have a sense of how to effect change by knowing about social movements.  
They will look for issues around social justice and will critically assess these in order to come to some 
understanding of their root causes and will be able to explain why specific social problems occur and 
will recognise the need for debate around issues in a move to establish change.  It is interesting that 
ƚŚĞĐƵƌƌŝĐƵůĂĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚŝŶtĞƐƚŚĞŝŵĞƌĂŶĚ<ĂŚŶĞ ?ƐƐƚƵĚǇƐĞĞŵƚŽƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƚŚƌĞĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚƚǇƉĞƐŽĨ
citizen.  While there is some overlap in terms of the expected behaviour of the citizens, there are 
elements missing from each; for example, only the justice-oriented citizens seem to be encouraged 
to engage in debate or discussion about issues, but, at the same time, the participatory citizen 
seems to move away from discussion towards getting things done.  In the same way that 
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responsibility is emphasised in the three types of citizen described above, as well as in other 
ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?ĐƵƌƌŝĐƵůĂ ?ƐŽƚŽŽŝƐƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ the individual.  The paradox is clear: curriculum is focused 
on the individual learner as it is the individual who must act, who must be responsible, but at the 
same time, the individual is part of the wider whole.  This atomistic view, that children exist as 
individuals in a way that adult citizens do not, makes educating for citizenship problematic.  There is 
a need for children to be part of the collective and to see themselves as such. 
Part of the problem with education for citizenship is that the concept of the citizen remains ill-
defined in curricular documentation and in practice (Cassidy and Christie, 2014). McCall (1991) 
helpfully offers a list of features necessary for being an effective citizen: 
 
 ?Ă person needs to be able to make reasoned judgments concerning the views of others, 
and needs to be able to modify his or her view if necessary. This requires comprehension 
skills, which in turn requires skill in analogical reasoning as well as in recognising and 
evaluating analogies; identifying assumptions; recognising fallacies; being careful about 
jumping to conclusions; recognising part/whole relationships; always being aware of 
alternatives; seeking out consistencies and inconsistencies in every sphere of life (p.1). 
 
While such features are not explicitly stated in curricula, the goals of citizenship education are clear. 
TŚĞǇĂƌĞĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĂĚƵůƚƐ ?ĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĞƚǇŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇůŝǀĞ ?
In order to achieve this, the teaching and learning must begin at an early stage, the stage when only 
limited participation is granted, and even then, about issues where there is little impact on the 
decisions children may wish to make.  This is predominantly located in schools and the topics are 
limited to the likes of the state of the ƉƵƉŝůƐ ? toilet facilities, the wearing of uniforms or the 
availability of certain types of snacks on school premises (Cassidy, 2012a).  Even in South Africa, 
where much has been done to address citizenship education since the end of apartheid, there has 
been concern that the representative council of learners might be too radical (Hunt, 2011).  Under 
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such circumstances, care needs to be taken that participation is not simply tokenistic and restrictive.  
Shultz and Guimaraes-Iosif (2012) would describĞƐƵĐŚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐĂƐ ‘ƚŚŝŶĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ? (p.244).  It is 
not that children are not interested in issues affecting their lives (Head et al., 2015) or that they 
ǁŽŶ ?ƚĞŶŐĂŐĞǁŝƚŚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ?ĂƐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĚďǇ ?ĨŽƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?by the 2014 Scottish 
independence referendum when 75% of sixteen and seventeen year-olds who were eligible to vote 
did so, with 97% of those voters saying they intend to vote in the future (The Electoral Commission, 
2014).  This would support what Metzger et al. (2015) propose when they suggest that there is no 
ƉƌŽďůĞŵǁŝƚŚǇŽƵŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐŚŝƉ ?ƚŚĂƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶŝƚĞƌŽĚŝŶŐ, it is simply changing and that 
this is facilitated through the rise in mobile technologies and social media.  In some ways, they 
would suggest, young people are more connected than ever.   
 
Wiseman et al. (2011) are clear that what the range of citizenship curricula has in common is the 
emphasis on  ‘ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨƉĞƌƐŽŶŚŽŽĚ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ
ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůďĞůŽŶŐŝŶŐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?). Gregg (2016) recognises the need for human rights education, though he 
situates this within tertiary education.  Not only is this too late, it fails to account for children as 
beings, capable of engaging with the world in which they live and this is a key factor in undermining 
ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐŚŝƉĂŶĚƚŚĞƌŽůĞƚŚĞǇŵŝŐŚƚƉůĂǇŝŶĞǀŽůǀŝŶŐĂƐƚĂƚĞ with human rights concerns at 
its core.  All curricula, no matter how well-intentioned, seem to progress the idea of preparation, 
that the child remains a citizen-in-waiting, that participation is fine and acceptable within the 
confines of the school but it should not extend beyond those parameters for they know not what 
ƚŚĞǇĚŽ ?ǀĞŶƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽƉƌŽĨĞƐƐĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞĚ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůe, Preece 
(2002), Veugelers (2007) and Biesta et al. (2009), the language is still one of preparation, of 
becoming.  An additional point to note is that children will learn to be citizens regardless of the 
citizenship curriculum in place (Preece, 2002).  It is perhaps also worth bearing in mind that 
totalitarian regimes have citizens and that citizenship is not the preserve of democracies. This, then, 
demands that we think carefully about the kind of society we wish to engender and how best to 
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educate children in that context.  Given that human rights are more likely to flourish in a democratic 
society, it is essential that we look towards approaches that will lead to a democracy where the 
human rights agenda is placed securely at the centre.  Democracy, sayƐsĞƵŐĞůĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ‘ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞ
ĂŝŵĞĚĂƚĞŵƉŽǁĞƌŝŶŐŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐƚĂŬĞƐƵƐďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ? ‘ŝƚŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐĂůůĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ
ŚƵŵĂŶďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĚŝŐŶŝƚǇ ? ?ĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ?ĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇĂŶĚũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ) ?
 
5 Deliberative participation 
Gregg (2016) is correct ƚŚĂƚ ? ‘To seek social transformation through civic education is to attempt 
social change through the practical consequences of ideas for the behaviour of people who hold 
ƚŚĞŵ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ) ?,Ğposits ƚŚĂƚ ‘ďĞƚƚĞƌ-civic-educated citizens are better able to persuade others to 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞŝŶŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?p.130).  What demands consideration is that children should be 
included in this drive for better-educated citizens and that they, children, may be involved in human 
rights politics.  For this to happen, the earliest stages of formal education should include human 
rights issues.  Human rights, by definition are political; they pertain to individuals living together and 
the manner in which they co-exist.  This is political. By introducing human rights politics to young 
children as part of the culture, life and learning in schools, it becomes part of their discourse, making 
it more likely to feature at the front of their thinking and in their corresponding behaviour.   
This goes beyond a notion of formal civic education at university level.  It is aligned with the 
suggestion that what is necessary is  ‘ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ? (Gregg, 2016, p. 122) or independent 
thinkers.  This independence of thought comes from living in families and attending schools, a long 
time before children reach university.  It is also worth bearing in mind that not all children will go on 
to university, though all are expected to participate in society.  While Gregg offers the example of 
post-Authoritarian societies, he might easily be talking about the over-whelming majority of schools 
and the structures that govern them almost anywhere in the world.  Schools are incredibly 
hierarchical and often socialise children into what Gregg sees as  ‘ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů education for state 
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citizenship that emphasizes  ‘responsibility, conformity, national loyalty and service to the 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? (p.122).  In South African schools the representative council of learners, for example, 
have become limited in their activity because the staff want to retain the decision-making powers by 
shaping the discussions that the pupils are allowed to have (Hunt, 2011).  Shultz and Guimaraes-Iosif 
(2012) recognise these hierarchies when they assert that  ‘ŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚŝĐĂů structures in schools may 
need to be shiĨƚĞĚ ? (p. 251) if we are to increase ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ participation and move towards the goal 
of a healthy democratic society.  Importantly, though, this will demand that children are included in 
driving the agenda forward since it does not appear to be the case that they have much input, if any, 
in the design and development of citizenship education, even in the likes of the UNESCO Associated 
Schools mentioned previously.  While the likes of Veugelers (2007) asserts the need for children to 
be able to practise their participation in schools, the power dynamics are such that the adults hold 
the power, meaning that children are rarely, if ever, permitted to participate authentically and so 
the structures and relationships are maintained.  This permission in itself is problematic since it is in 
the gift of adults in authority rather than power being afforded to individuals across the school 
population. 
 
Certainly, as Biesta et al.  ? ? ? ? ? )ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ ?ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚĂŶĚŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐƐŚĂƉĞĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐŚŝƉ
learning and their engagement with democracy, but the same holds for adults.  They too are bound 
by the opportunities available to them and the contexts in which they find themselves.  Marginalised 
adults will also struggle to participate, engage or situate larger citizenship, political issues as central 
to their lives if they are not afforded access and decision-making powers.  The exclusion of children 
in shaping society mirrors that experienced by women in the past, and sadly, in some places in 
contemporary society.  InĚĞĞĚ ?ŝŶĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐŚŝƉ ?WƌĞĞĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? )ŵĂŬĞƐƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵ
that citizenship is gendered because of the perceived roles that men/women are given or permitted 
in society.  This, she says, is a subordination of women.  If this is true for women, then it is equally 
true for children, though it might be suggested that female children are, then, marginalised even 
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ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?WƌĞĞĐĞŝƐĐŽƌƌĞĐƚǁŚĞŶƐŚĞŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƐƚŚĂƚ ‘dĞƌŵƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ĚŝĂůŽŐƵĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ĂƌĞ
irrelevant for marginalised groups if institutional systems and practices do not create opportunities 
ĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĞǀŽŝĐĞƐƚŽďĞŚĞĂƌĚ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ?   ‘dŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ? ?ƐĂǇƐWƌĞĞĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ‘ŝŵƉůŝĞƐƚŚĂƚ
people play a part in shaping how they are governed, through formal politics as well as societies, 
ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŐƌŽƵƉƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? )ĂŶĚ ?ŝƚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚĞĚŚĞƌĞ ?ƚŝƐƐŚŽƵůĚŝŶĐůƵĚĞĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ? 
 
Some countries are trying to move away from the traditional and conformist agenda Gregg rejects 
and more towards what he ĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞƐ P ‘ĂƉĞĚĂŐŽŐǇ ?ŽĨƉůƵƌĂůŝƐŵ ?individual autonomy, active 
citizenship, and iŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?) that works toward encouraging the development of a 
critical, questioning citizenry.  dŚĞŐŽĂůŽĨ ‘ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚ ?ĞĚƵĐĂƚĞĚĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ? ?p.108) comes through public 
deliberation and, if we aƌĞƐĞƌŝŽƵƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƉůĂĐĞŽĨĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶŝŶƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ĨĂĐŝůƚĂƚĞƐĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ
participation by including them in deliberative activity and enabling action on their part.  dŚŝƐ ‘ĞŶƚĂŝůƐ
that schools themselves can be part of the transition away from authoritariĂŶŝƐŵ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?); and while 
education for citizenship does not, traditionally, imply a human rights focus, it demands that 
curriculum bodies, teacher education institutions and teachers themselves, embrace the notion of 
the activist teacher (Sachs, 2003), that education is a tool for empowerment, for children and the 
adults that work with them.  Education that takes a rights-based approach to education, where 
children learn about, through and for human rights (Struthers, 2015) is required.  While Struthers 
identifies that this may be a limited way of approaching teaching and learning about human rights, 
she explains that the tripartite approach to human rights education is indivisible, all three elements 
are required in concert; it is through this mechanism that children come to understand what human 
rights are and the values related to these.   
 
Children, in learning through human rights, are taught in a manner that is respectful of their rights 
and the rights of those teaching them.  While not divorced from the other two aspects of human 
rights education, this third feature should, says Struthers (2015) citing the United Nations 
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Declaration on Human Rights Education and Training,  ‘ĞŵƉŽǁĞƌƉĞƌƐŽŶƐƚŽĞŶũŽǇĂŶĚĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƚŚĞŝƌ
rights and to respect and uphold the ƌŝŐŚƚƐŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ?p.4).  Such an approach demands dialogue and 
democratic classrooms which leads to the third element of human rights education, the learning for 
human rights.   Given that, by and large, children are located in schools, it is arguably in schools that 
children should be inducted into deliberative practices by seeing and experiencing these human 
rights and associated deliberation in action.  It is not sufficient, as Struthers (2015) argues, to focus 
on teaching about human rights since such an approach would not allow for contextual information 
or understanding.  We must, asserts Gregg (2016), ŵŽǀĞĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵ ‘ƚŚĞcentralized-state legacy of 
ƵŶŝĨŽƌŵŝƚǇŝŶĐƵƌƌŝĐƵůĂ ?ƚĞǆƚďŽŽŬƐ ?ĂŶĚƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ) if we are to promote what he calls 
 ‘ŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ?.  This articulates well with Shultz and Guimaraes-/ŽƐŝĨ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )
ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞĂĐƚŝǀĞĂŶĚƚŚĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƐƚĐŝƚŝǌĞŶ ?tŚŝůĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƐƚĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ‘ĞŶŐĂŐĞŝŶǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ
scripts, creating the scene, active citizens follow scripts and participate in scenes that are already 
ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ ?tŚŝůĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƐƚĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐĂƌĞĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĂĐƚŝǀĞĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐĂƌĞŶŽƚ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ) ?dŚĞǇƐĞĞĐůĞĂƌůǇƚŚĂƚ
citizens should be emancipated, that activist citizens are required in order to promote democracy 
authenticallǇ ?dŚŝƐ ?ƚŚĞǇŶŽƚĞ ?ŝƐĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ‘ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĂŶĚƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ
ĂĐƚĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? )ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĨŽƌĂƐĐŚŽŽůƚŽďĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĂƐĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐŝƚ ‘ƐŚŽƵůĚĐƌĞĂƚĞĂ
ĚŝĂůŽŐŝĐĂů ?ĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƐƉĂĐĞ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? )for its teachers and, one would argue, its 
pupils.   It is in such a deliberative context, where children might discover the plurality of ideas and 
beliefs, where values and assumptions can be challenged, where children are taught to think and to 
practise their thinking and reasoning that the answer may lie in moving towards a state with human 
rights at its core.   
 
It is in such a deliberative context, where children might discover the plurality of ideas and beliefs, 
where values and assumptions can be challenged, where children are taught to think and to practise 
their thinking and reasoning that the answer may lie in growing a state where human rights are core. 
One approach to such development where individuals come to this through reason, dialogue and 
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community engagement, where they encounter the ideas of others and can challenge values and 
assumptions may be through the practice of Philosophy with Children (PwC).   
 
 
6 Philosophy with Children 
 
There is a range of approaches to PwC, but all grew from DĂƚƚŚĞǁ>ŝƉŵĂŶ ?ƐWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĨŽƌŚŝůĚƌĞŶ
(P4C) programme in the USA in the 1970s (Lipman et al., 1980; Lipman, 2003; Pardales & Girod, 
2006; McCall, 2009; Vansieleghem & Kennedy, 2011).  There is a difference between traditional, 
academic philosophy and PwC (Murris, 2000).  Gazzard (1996) is helpful in making the distinction 
clear; she proposes that philosophy can be considered in three ways.  The first is in the manner in 
which the likes of Socrates might recognise it, where the individual searches for meaning or wisdom.  
The second is the one Murris (2000) describes, the academic philosophy found in universities where 
students learn the history of ideas.  'ĂǌǌĂƌĚ ?Ɛ third way of considering, is around the notion of 
reflective thinking.  This might, of course, be aligned to the first way of thinking about philosophy by 
ĞŶŐĞŶĚĞƌŝŶŐǁŚĂƚ'ĂǌǌĂƌĚĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐĂƐ ‘ĂƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝǀĞŚĂďŝƚŽĨŵŝŶĚ ? (p.14).  She exemplifies the 
distinction between philosophical reflection and, say, scientific reflection by suggesting that 
philosophical deliberation may consider ethical questions around the likes of abortion, such as those 
related to the mother ?Ɛ ĂŶĚ ?ŽƌƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?dŚŝƐŝƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ?ƐŚĞƐĂǇƐ ?ƚŽ the kinds of questions 
that might be asked in scientific inquiry on the same topic, where scientific reflection would consider 
the likely survival of the foetus or the chances of adoption for an unwanted child.   
Put very simply, PwC is an approach to practical philosophy; it involves children engaging in 
structured philosophical dialogue. The common general feature across the approaches to PwC is that 
the participants are expected to contribute to the dialogue by making connections with 
contributions from other participants in the dialogue. They do this by agreeing and/or disagreeing 
with what they have heard and then proceed to give their reasons for that agreement or 
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disagreement. The principle is that no one contribution is more important than another, but that all 
participants work to address the question together with all contributions being valued in the shared 
search for meaning (Cassidy, 2007; McCall, 2009). The goal of PwC is to promote philosophising in 
everyday language that is accessible to all participants.  
Gazzard (1996) is clear that philosophically reflective thinking should not be a discrete activity, it 
should articulate with ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ life and the manner in which one engages in that life.  Indeed, 
Lunenberg and Korthagen (2009) also see links between ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ action and careful deliberation, while 
Schertz (2007) aims to avoid what he refers to as  ‘ƉĂƐƐŝǀĞ ĞŵƉĂƚŚǇ ? through dialogue by practising 
PwC, emphasising that the activity promotes cognitive and metacognitive engagement as well as 
enhancing the affective domain.  Indeed, the work of Topping and Trickey (2007) and Trickey (2008) 
support this claim.  While thinking and reasoning is vital in the promotion of human rights, the 
affective dimension should not be ignored.  Schertz (2007) is emphatic that teaching empathy should 
not be about socialising children in order to maintain the social order, rather, it is necessary, he says, 
as  ‘a form of social liberation for the express purpose of sharing feeling states to foster personal and 
societal growth and ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ? (p. 187).  He takes this further to explain that empathy is a 
 ‘ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů phenomenon that provides a connective link for moral ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? (p.190).  This echoes 
'ĂǌǌĂƌĚ ?Ɛ (1996) earlier suggestion that there is a need for reflective thinking and Cassidy ?Ɛ (2012b) 
proposition that engaging in philosophical activity such as that promoted by PwC will support 
children to  ‘ůŝǀĞ ǁĞůů ? ? In living well it is anticipated that human rights will be respected and 
promoted and that a cohesive society will be formed.  
 
dŚĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞĐĂŶŶŽƚĂŶĚƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĚĨƌŽŵŽŶĞ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐƉůĂĐĞŝŶ
society.  Schertz (2007) suggests that PwC might be the approach required to bridge the link 
between moral contemplation and the lived experience.  This is important given that we do not exist 
abstracted from people and their moral codes and reflections.  What must be borne in mind, 
however, is that it is not enough simply to assert that children ought to engage in moral reasoning or 
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deliberative thinking in general, there needs to be structures in place, whether in the form of the 
curriculum or the pedagogy employed by teachers.  A dialogic space needs to be established where 
children can engage in discussing ideas where they are free to explore  the plurality of ideas in order 
to critique their own ideas and those of others before determining what they think, how they will 
act, and ultimately take their deliberations further.  What is proposed is a cyclical framework, not 
one where individuals come to conclusions and stay there; for a deliberative society to function, it 
demands continual checking and re-checking of ideas.  Veugelers (2007) recognises that for a 
democracy to work ŝƚ ‘ŶĞĞĚƐĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞƐŽĐŝĂůůǇĂǁĂƌĞĂŶĚĂƵƚŽŶŽŵŽƵƐ ?ƚŚĂƚ ? ?ĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ
ŵƵƐƚďĞǁŽŶƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚůǇĂŶĚŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĞĚ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ) ?ŚĞƐĞĞƐŝƚĂƐĂƉrocess and this process can only be 
won and perpetuated if it is continually interrogated by its deliberative citizens, regardless of age. 
 
In creating his approach to PwC, Lipman (Lipman, 2003; Murris, 2008) was clear that teaching 
children to philosophise had a role to play in advancing democracy and considered it as essential 
ƚŚĂƚĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐĂƌĞĂďůĞƚŽ ‘ƚŚŝŶŬĨůĞǆŝďůǇďƵƚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůǇ ?Lipman, 2003, p.208) and that if they cannot 
do so then they are easy prey to conformity, propaganda and brainwashing.  In a study to explore 
the use of PwC to promote democracy, Bartels et al. (2015) claim that supporting children to 
philosophise is an effective way of ensuring children engage with other children and that this 
engagement is critical, it encourages them to think collaboratively and that this suggests an 
opportunity for them to practise democracy.  Bartels et al. (2015) see PwC as part of citizenship 
education, as do Garratt and Piper (2011) who propose that introducing philosophy into the 
curriculum is likely ƚŽƌĂŝƐĞĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐůĞǀĞůƐŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐ ? 
 
Gregory (2008) suggests that ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞĚ ‘to formulate their own judgements 
about what is what, and how things relate, and how their corner of the world could be more just, 
ŵŽƌĞďĞĂƵƚŝĨƵů ?ŵŽƌĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵů ? (p.7); this is part of what it means to engage fully in society.  A 
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ĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚŝƐŝƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚďǇ^ŚĂƌƉ ?ŝŶ'ƌĞŐŽƌǇ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )DĞŶĚŚĂŵŝĂůŽŐƵĞǁŚĞŶƐŚĞĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐ
that what Lipman had in mind when creating a program of philosophy for children was  
the art of making judgments that might improve that [everyday] experience... as a quest to 
ŚĞůƉƵƐƚŽůĞĂĚƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞůǇďĞƚƚĞƌůŝǀĞƐ ?zŽƵ ?ǀĞŐŽƚƚŽďĞĐƵƌŝŽƵƐĂŶĚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ ?ĂďŽƵƚ
different kinds of meaning], and know how to think about them carefully, and to dialogue 
about them with others who think and feel differently (p.200).   
This, for Lipman (2003), is crucial; ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŝƐ ‘ŶŽƚũƵƐƚƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐǁĞƵƐĞƚŽƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?ŝƚ ?Ɛ
chosen deliberately to help children recognise those kinds of meaning ? (Gregory, 2011, p.204).  
Elsewhere Gregory (2008) lists the demands on children participating in PwC; they are involved in: 
creating hypotheses, clarifying their terms, giving and evaluating reasons, offering examples 
and counter examples, questioning assumptions, and drawing inferences, as well as social 
practices like sharing perspectives, listening attentively, helping others make their point, and 
ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐĂŶĚďƵŝůĚŝŶŐŽŶŽƚŚĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŝĚĞĂƐ ?Ɖ ? ? )  
These are all essential in taking forward democratic citizenship of children  W and adults  W and 
articulate well with McCall ?s (1991) list, above, of what is required in being an effective citizen.  In 
addressing the need for promoting human rights, in advancing democracy and participation of all, 
the features outlined by McCall are undeniably important and PwC in its approach to shared 
meaning making through a community of philosophical inquiry appears to be an effective way of 
facilitating desirable citizen behaviour, but in a manner that does not see children as other, as 






What is hoped is that in engaging philosophically with the wider world around them, by asking 
questions about that world and inquiring into the questions in collaboration with others, that a 
sense of the political is engendered, that children become more political and that this will in turn 
lead to action (Cassidy, 2007, 2012b).  It is crucial that one recognises the likes of anomalies, 
disruption, injustice in order to challenge them; if one fails to see these issues and engage in the 
associated arguments, then it is not likely that one will ever work to address them in any positive 
sense, the injustices will continue to be perpetrated and perpetuated.  Shultz and Guiamaraes-Iosif 
(2012) are correct to stress that a healthy, democratic society demands that individuals learn  ‘ƚŽ 
participate and deliberate in a more emancipatory and humane ǁĂǇ ? (p.251).  This will support 
individuals to enact their citizenship and become the activist authors of scenes Schultz and 
Guiamaraes-Iosif describe.  If, as Biesta et al. (2009) suggest,  ‘ǇŽƵŶŐ people learn from the 
opportunities for action, participation and reflection that are afforded by the practices and 
communities in their everyday ůŝǀĞƐ ? (p.21) then we have to ensure that such opportunities exist.  Of 
course, children must be inducted into their participation; they cannot simply be expected to know 
how to participate. Their induction may happen in a range of fora, but given that the majority of 
children at least attend primary schools, deliberate induction may be situated in schools. Adopting a 
rights-based approach to this induction, children should learn through a democratic approach.  They 
ought to be consulted and included in decision-making processes within the school. They should be 
given opportunities to engage in dialogue to explore their ideas and the ideas of others. Beyond the 
school environment children might, as suggested above, be included in citizen juries where they, as 
in school, are able to contribute to the debate about the ways in which their society should be run.  
 
What is essential is that the induction cannot be seen as a preparation for later participation but that 
they are seen as novice participants, that they learn about their world and become better able to 
articulate and reason in order to be better immersed in their participation.  This is as true for adults 
as for children, it is merely the case that assumptions have been made that by growing older one 
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becomes more competent or adept and should, therefore, be more entitled to participate.  Simply 
because one is not as adept as another does not mean that the individual concerned should be 
excluded; for instance, a teacher or plumber are equally entitled to express their views and to cast 
ƚŚĞŝƌǀŽƚĞƐŽŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝƐƐƵĞƐƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽĂŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ?/ƚŵĂǇƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇďĞ
assumed that the teacher is better situated than the plumber to understand the implications of the 
manifesto, but the plumber is not precluded in airing her/his views.  Similarly, children are not 
perhaps as competent or knowledgeable in every matter, but they, like the plumber discussing 
educational issues, will have views.  In harnessing these views, by including children in the dialogue, 
they will be more politicised and more likely to engage with the world in which they live.  In so 
engaging they should come to recognise the interconnectedness and interdependency required for a 
society to function.  Additionally, in engaging in dialogue they will further appreciate the need for 
community and collaboration and see how this can work to promote a common goal.  They, through 
interrogating issues, will recognise what is good, or right or fair, and will use this thinking to work for 
the betterment of society. This critical reflection, in effect, will support the promotion of human 
ƌŝŐŚƚƐŝĨ ?ĂƐ'ĂƌƌĂƚƚĂŶĚWŝƉĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? )ŚŽƉĞ ?ŝƚ ‘ĚŝƐƚƵƌďƐĂŶĚ ĂĚŝĐĂůůǇƵŶƐĞƚƚůĞƐĂůůŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚŝĐĂŶĚĂŶƚŝ-
democratic conceptions and practices of citizenship education and learning in schools ?(p.73). They 
ƐĞĞĚŝĂůŽŐŝĐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůŝŶƋƵŝƌǇĂƐ ‘ŝŶŚĂďŝƚŝŶŐĂǁŝĚĞƌƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐƉĂĐĞ ?(p.73), a wider 
social and cultural space, it could be argued, to which children currently have access.   
Indeed, Garrett and Piper (2011), as Cassidy (2007) previously, propose that community groups of 
philosophical inquiry should be established, that there is scope for people to mix across ages and 
backgrounds.  Through philosophising, or deliberating, participants seek understanding to inform 
their lives. This, thinks Garrett and Piper (2011)may be a successful approach to enhancing 
citizenship and ensuring political engagement for the whole rather than the individual, that as a 
ƐŽĐŝĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŵŽǀĞƐ ‘ĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵĂŶĂƚƵƌĂůŝǌĞĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐĂŶĚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂŵŽƌĞĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚŝŶĐůƵƐŝǀĞ ?
ĐŽƐŵŽƉŽůŝƚĂŶĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? )ŽĨĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐŚŝƉ.  While school is a good place to begin the induction 
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of children into philosophical inquiry as logistically it is simple because they are in regular 
attendance, it is vital that citizenship education moves beyond the confines of the school.  
Children  W and their teachers  W should see citizenship as more than a subject or curricular area and 
recognise the relevance of their deliberations in order that they might more fully engage as 
participative citizens with other citizens.  This would perhaps satisfy Biesta et al. (2009) who 
emphasise tŚĂƚĞŶŚĂŶĐŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐŚŝƉĐƵƌƌŝĐƵůƵŵŝƐŶŽƚƚŚĞĚŝůĞŵŵĂ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐ ‘ƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂů
ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨǇŽƵŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐŚŝƉ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ), and this is where the future of democracy lies.  If, as 
Biesta et al. (2009) contend, schools are seen by young people as non-democratic, hierarchical 
structures, then this will reinforce their feelings of disempowerment and sense of limited agency.  
They may, in fact, not even sense their disempowerment; they may simply collude with the 
structures and hierarches in place because they have not been taught how to question and 
deliberate, they have not had their participation facilitated.  Their status as less than full members of 
society is reinforced.  If participation is denied then so too are voice, democracy, and even 
persŽŶŚŽŽĚǁŚĞƌĞ ?ĂƐ'ƌĞŐŐ ? ? ? ? ? )ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ?ǁĞ ‘ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĂƐƐŽŵĞŽŶĞǁŽƌƚŚǇŽĨ
ŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ?Drawing on Dewey, Garratt and Piper (2011) recognise the importance of 
social learning that is active rather than passive and that positively aĨĨŝƌŵƐ ‘ƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨ
democracy and human rights, striving to encourage the development of more equal and respectful 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂĚƵůƚƐĂŶĚǇŽƵŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ?Given Tremmel ?DĂƐŽŶ ?ŝŵŝƚƌŝũŽƐŬŝĂŶĚ'ŽĚůŝ ?Ɛ 
 ? ? ? ? ? )ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶĂŐĞĚĞŵŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐǁŝůů ‘ŐŽŚĂŶĚŝŶŚĂŶĚǁŝƚŚĂƐŚŝĨƚŝŶƉŽǁĞƌ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚĂƐĂĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞ ? ‘ƚŚĞǇŽƵŶŐĞƌŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŝůůǁŝƚŶĞƐƐƚŚĞĚŝŵŝŶƵƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ŝƚƐƐŽĐŝĞƚĂů ?ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉŽǁĞƌ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ) ?ŝƚŝƐŝŵƉortant that we focus on supporting 
ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĐŝǀŝĐĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĂĐŽŶ and Frankel (2014) suggest that a social 
partnership between adults and children is important in taking forward human rights.  In short, the 
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